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Abstract
In United States v. Gooding, the Supreme Court quashed an indictment
against John Gooding for engaging in international slave trading, a violation
of the Slave Trade Act of 1818. The Slave Trade Act of 1818 modified the
penalties for engaging the in slave trading, and switched the burden of proof
to the defendant, to disprove the presumption that the defendant had
engaged in the slave trade. This article looks at how United States v.
Gooding stands as a step backwards toward condoning and legitimizing the
international slave trade. This paper also examines the moral relativism
expressed in the United States’ social and legal positions on both domestic
and international slave trading, while exploring the uniqueness of
Baltimore, Maryland’s role in the domestic and international slave trade.
Disciplines: Criminal Law, Evidence
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UNITED STATES V. GOODING:
THE IMPERFECT INDICTMENT THAT CREATED THE PERFECT
DEFENSE FOR THE ILLEGAL SLAVE TRADE

Fernando D. Kirkman*
INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, slavery is as American as apple pie.1 The African
slave trade was legal in the United States for nearly 200 years–from the
1620’s when African slaves began to arrive in the Dutch and British
colonies until 1808 when the “Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of
1807” went into effect.2 Racialized slavery was an integral element in the
formation of the United States. The transatlantic slave trade, substantially
contributed to sustaining the practice of enslaving Africans. Though
America has benefited significantly from the transatlantic slave trade, by the
late seventeen hundreds many Americans viewed the trading of slaves, as
inhumane and morally reprehensible.3 In response to the change in public
opinion, Congress passed the Slave Trade Act of 1794 (“1794 Act”), which
prohibited the use of any U.S. port or shipyard for the purpose of fitting out
or building any ship to be used for the introduction of slaves.4 Over the
years, Congress built upon the 1794 Act by adding more penalties and
enforcement mechanisms. In United States v. Gooding5, the Supreme Court
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CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY & THESAURUS (online ed. 2016)
(considered very typical of the United States or of the people of the United States).
2
See Engel Sluiter, New Light on the "20 and Odd Negroes" Arriving in Virginia,
August 1619, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 395, 395 (1997); An Act of March 2, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
3
W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1638-1870, at 80 (Dover Publications Inc. 1970) (1896).
4
Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347.
5
25 U.S. 460 (1827).
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quashed an indictment against John Gooding for engaging in international
slave trading, a violation of the Slave Trade Act of 1818 (“1818 Act”).6 The
1818 Act modified the penalties for engaging the in slave trading, and
switched the burden of proof to the defendant, to disprove the presumption
that the defendant had engaged in the international slave trade.7 The United
States’ attempts to work around the ‘1808 compromise’, and the Slave
Trade Acts that followed were encouraging steps toward ending the
racialized slavery of Africans, however United States v. Gooding stands as a
step backwards toward condoning and legitimizing the international slave
trade, because of the loophole Gooding created in enforcing the 1818 Act.8
Gooding was a “dog whistle” to United States merchants who engaged in
the slave trade that the Government would not be able to enforce the 1818
Act.9 The Marshall Court’s ruling on the defective indictment in United
States v. Gooding is historically significant because of the ruling’s impact,
or lack thereof, on the international slave trade. 10 However, the Court’s
ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence from a co-conspirator may
be Gooding’s most enduring legacy.11
Legal scholars have often cited United States v. Gooding because of
the holding’s impact on hearsay evidence. However, Gooding has received
very little attention for its importance in United States’ legal history. This
paper examines the legal, political, and social context at play in United
States v. Gooding, and the 1818 Act. Part I of this paper examines the moral
relativism expressed in the United States’ social and legal positions on both
the domestic and international slave trade when the Court heard Gooding.12
Part II explores the uniqueness of Baltimore, Maryland, where John
Gooding did most of his business as a merchant, and the city’s role in the
domestic and international slave trade.13 Part III recounts and rationalizes
the United States’ piecemeal approach that led to the 1818 Act, the statute
at issue in United States v. Gooding.14 Finally, Part IV analyzes United
States v. Gooding’s long and short-term effects.15

6

Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat 450 (1818).
Id.
8
Infra Part IV.
9
Infra Part IV.
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Infra Part IV.
11
Infra Part IV.
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Infra Part I.
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Infra Part II.
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Infra Part III.
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PART I: THE TRANS-ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE, PRIVATEERING,
MORAL RELATIVISM

AND

A. Ironically, the United States was against the international slave trade,
while permitting slave trading domestically.
By the early eighteenth century, public opinion began to shift on the
transatlantic slave trade. Curiously, Americans took little issue with the
practice of enslaving Africans solely because of their race, but opposed the
transportation means and methods employed during the trans-Atlantic
international slave trade.16 During the transatlantic slave trade, Europeans
traded goods to Africa, for kidnapped Africans; then the kidnapped Africans
were sold into slavery in the United States, and other countries in North and
South America, for raw materials, to later be used in Europe.17 Millions of
Africans were captured to be sold into slavery.18
The Middle passage was the leg of the journey where kidnapped
Africans traveled to the Americas. This journey was brutal for the Africans
kidnapped for sale into slavery and many died.19 Conditions onboard ships
were typically cramped; sickness was a significant problem, killing many of
the enslaved and the crews of the slave ships as well, and shortages of food
and drinking water were chronic.20 Misjudgments in rations, weather
problems, and slave resistance onboard ships could affect the length of the
passage and the conditions of the people onboard. The psychological trauma
of the Middle Passage was so harsh that an English surgeon in 1790
estimated that two-thirds of the deaths on the slave journey were due to a
“mortal melancholy” similar to an involuntary suicide.21 Additionally, the
Middle Passage stripped the Africans of their ontology and identity;

16
Steven Deyle, An “Abominable” New Trade: The Closing of the African Slave
Trade and the Changing Patterns of U.S. Political Power”, 1808-60, 66 WM. & MARY Q.
833, 836 (2009) (Though some Deep South states reopened the trade after the war, the
United States officially abolished the African slave trade on January 1, 1808. This event
occasioned much celebration, and many Americans saw it as a great national humanitarian
achievement).
17
THOMAS HUGH, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE,
1440-1870, at 293 (Simon and Schuster 1999).
18
See Appendix II.
19
Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten Crime
Against Humanity as Defined by International Law, 19 AM. U. INTL. L. REV. 883 (2004)
(Many slaves died from fever, measles, and scurvy while aboard the slave-ships, before
they even reached the shores of the West).
20
Paul Lovejoy, The “Middle Passage”: The Enforced Migration of Africans across
the Atlantic 1, 4 (2007), http://bernard.pitzer.edu/~hfairchi/pdf/Blacks/MiddlePassage.pdf
21
Id.
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because once they exited the ship, there were no longer a person, but rather
a fungible commodity.

Figure 1: United States slave trade, 183022

Ultimately, the United States banned the international slave trade, in
part because of the moral concerns with the conditions in which Africans
were imported into the United States.23 The United States’ nuanced
opposition to the international slave trade is unintelligible. While
Americans found the international slave trade morally reprehensible, the
domestic slave trade thrived in the United States.24 Alarmingly, the
transportation conditions for Blacks domestically were just as deplorable as

22

United States Slave trade 1830,
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3b36072/?co=app (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
23
Regulating the Trade, THE SCHOMBURG CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN BLACK CULTURE
http://abolition.nypl.org/essays/us_constitution/4 (last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (“In his
annual message to Congress in December 1806, Thomas Jefferson, who had long opposed
the trade (but not slavery itself) …took a moment in his address to "congratulate" his
"fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period at which you may interpose your authority
constitutionally to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further participation
in those violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending
inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our
country have long been eager to proscribe.”).
24
DEYLE, supra note 16, at 834-35 (“After the American Revolution this internal trade
became a major operation, annually transporting thousands of enslaved men and women
from the Upper South to the Lower South. “Dwarfing the transatlantic slave trade that had
carried Africans to the [North American] main- land”, this new intraregional slave trade
became a "Second Middle Passage," in Ira Berlin's words. An even greater number of
American slaves were sold locally from one owner to another”).
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their international equivalents.25 Embedded in these almost inherently
contradictory positions lies a logical tension only a moral relativist stance
could resolve; where one concludes that life time enslavement is acceptable,
but it is unacceptable to subject someone to the harsh conditions of the
Middle Passage during the transatlantic slave trade.
In Congress, sectionalism between politicians from the North and
South also effected the United States’ nuanced position on the international
slave trade. For politicians representing states in the North, moral objections
guided their calls to end the United States involvement in the international
slave trade. During or immediately after the Revolutionary War, five states
would either end slavery outright (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) or
pass gradual abolition acts (Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Connecticut)
that would lead to a relatively speedy end to slavery.26 The North’s
politicians argued that slavery was inherently immoral and a violation of the
principles fought for in the Revolutionary War, where America fought for
its very own independence.27 While moral concerns guided the North’s
objections, financial concerns bolstered the South’s political support of
slavery and the importing of Africans for slave labor; because the
agriculturally centered Southern economy was dependent on the free labor
provided by slaves.28
This sectionalism on the issue of the domestic slave trade, and the
international slave trade was most apparent during the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, and when Congress started to work on the Act
Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves of 1807 (“1807 Act”). The
Constitutional Convention convened to discuss national regulations of
domestic and international commerce. Southern states’ representatives were
adamant that there be assurances that a strong federal government on
commerce would not regulate the South’s most precious commodity—free
slave labor. During one debate, South Carolina's Pierce Butler said: “[t]he
security the South[ern] States want is that their negroes may not be taken
from them which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very
good mind to do.”29 Butler’s fear was one that many in the South shared,
25

Id. (In 1798 a Delaware Quaker named Warner Mifflin wrote a letter to President
John Adams. After traveling through nearby Maryland, Mifflin was struck by "the
abominable Trade carried on through that part of the Country, by Negroe-Drovers, buying
Drove after Drove of the poor afflicted Blacks, like droves of Cattel for Market; carrying
them into the Southern States for Speculation; regardless of the separation of nearest
Connections & natural ties); Also see infra Part II.
26
Paul Finkelman, The American Suppression of the African Slave Trade: Lessons on
Legal Change, Social Policy, and Legislation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 431, 439 (2009).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 364 (Max Farrand ed.,
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even though there was no strong Northern anti-slavery movement during
the 1787 convention.30 In the end, the North and South agreed to a
compromise that delayed any ban on the importation of slaves until 1808.31
In 1807, once again Northern and Southern states split over the issue of
slavery.32
Moral argument drove the public debate on the international slave
trade but economic motives undergird the United States’ position. The slave
trade had become less important to the Northern economy and the upper
South (e.g. Maryland and Virginia) supported the ban on international slave
trading because competed with their domestic efforts to sell slaves to the
lower South.33 The United States steps to ban the international slave trade,
while the domestic trade flourished demonstrates that the country supported
the ban for many reasons—some moral, others economic or even purely
political. Regardless of the motivation, this moral relativism on the issue of
the slave trade allowed for enslaved African to remain slaves, exclusively
because of their race, until the county finally banned the racialized
slavery.34
B. Some privateers, who once were defenders of the United States in times
of war, betrayed the country for the economic gains of participating in the
slave trade.35
During the War of 1812, privateers played a major role in helping
America protect her interest at home and abroad by capturing warships as
prizes that the privateers could later exchange for sizeable profits. 36 United
1966) (1787).
30
FINKELMAN, supra note 26, at 441.
31
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. (“The migration or importation of such persons as any
of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be
imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”).
32
Infra Part III.B.
33
LOW COUNTRY DIGITAL HISTORY INITIATIVE Voyage of the Echo: The Trials of an
Illegal Trans-Atlantic Slave Ship; Historical Context: Abolishing the Trans-Atlantic Slave
Trade, http://ldhi.library.cofc.edu/exhibits/show/voyage-of-the-echo-the-trials/historiccontext--abolishing-t (last visited: Dec. 21, 2016).
34
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
35
Frederick C. Leiner, Yes Privateers Mattered, NAVAL HIST. MAG., Apr. 2014
http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2014-03/yes-privateers-mattered (Privateers
were privately owned merchant ships that, in wartime, were armed by their owners and
licensed by the government to attack the maritime trade of the enemy, privateers profited
by the sale of ships and cargoes they captured).
36
Id. (“Privateering was critical for the American war effort. In the three years of the
War of 1812, U.S. Navy warships captured about 250 vessels, but American privateers
took at least five times that number of British merchant vessels—at least 1,200, but
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States privateering was born out of necessity. In 1812, the then young
United States did not have a strong navy forcing the country to rely on
privateers to help defend herself.37 In a letter on August 4, 1812, the then
former President Thomas Jefferson predicted that the Royal Navy would
prevail over the United States Navy but “our privateers will eat out the
vitals of their commerce.”38 Once the War of 1812 ended privateers needed
to make a living; and investors like John Gooding, were not willing to let
United States’ law stop them from making a profit.39 The Panic of 1819 also
drove many investors in privateer ships to search for new ways to monetize
their investments.40 The Panic of 1819 turned greedy investors in privateer
ships that engaged in the international slave trade to desperate businessman
trying to avoid bankruptcy.41
After the War of 1812, the United States’ demand for privateers
decreased, and merchants who invested in the privateer ships turned to
illegal methods to make money.42 Some privateers turned to South America
revolutions as a way to make money, which violated the United States
Neutrality Acts43. Other privateers turned to participating in the
international slave trade, which the United States banned in 1807, and had
significantly regulated since 1794.44 While the international slave trade was
illegal in the United States and Great Britain, it was legal for ships
probably as many as 2,000, although no one knows for sure. The privateers burned some of
the British merchant ships they captured, ransomed others back to their owners, lost many
to recapture by the British navy, and brought home prize ships and goods that sold for
millions of dollars.”).
37
Id. (When the United States went to war against Britain in June 1812, the U.S. Navy
had about 15 warships in commission, including a squadron of three frigates and two
sloops-of-war that sailed from New York within an hour of receiving word of the
declaration of war).
38
Id.
39
See Appendix I.
40
See generally MURRAY NEWTON ROTHBARD, THE PANIC OF 1819: REACTIONS AND
POLICIES (1962) (noting that the Panic of 1819 was America’s first financial crisis).
41
David Head, A Different Kind of Maritime Predation: South American Privateering
from Baltimore, 1816-1820, 7(2) INT’L J. NAVAL HIST. (2008) (Mounting losses could not
have come at a worse time for Baltimore investors. The Panic of 1819, caused in no small
part by a scandal at the Maryland branch of the Second Bank of the United States,
devastated the city’s merchant community).
42
David Head, Baltimore Seafarers, Privateering, and the South American
Revolutions, 1816-1820, 103 MD. HIST. MAG. 269, 270-71 (2008).
43
HEAD, supra note 42, at 270-71; EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 116 (1992). (The
Neutrality Act of 1794 made it illegal for an American to wage war against any country at
peace with the United States. The act also forbid foreign war vessels to outfit in American
waters and sets a three-mile territorial limit at sea).
44
Infra Part III.B.
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registered in Spain to engage in the trade, and United States privateers used
this loophole to engage in the slave trade.45 Specifically, Baltimore ships
were coveted vessels for the illegal privateering missions and the illegal
slave trade, because of their reputation as the fastest and most nimble ships
on the sea.46
Congress attempted to legislate away United States privateers’
involvement in the international slave trade.47 However, privateers and their
investors made so much money capturing, and enslaving people that the risk
out weighed the reward, because the laws were ineffective and enforcement
was lax.48 In 1820, a Baltimore Clipper could carry on average 507 African
slaves and make sixty seven thousand dollars per voyage.49 A report in 1849
claimed that a Baltimore clipper made four hundred thousand dollars from
eleven slave trading voyages over four years.50 The General Winder, the
ship at issue in United States v. Gooding, allegedly was carrying 290
Africans to sell into slavery when it docked in Cuba, a haul that would
make John Gooding a significant amount of money.51
The risk to reward ratio for engaging in the international slave trade
was skewed in favor of engaging in the illegal trade because enforcement
was sparse. Caught and convicted slavers were often pardoned, and the only
penalty suffered was the loss of the illegal captured Africans. 52 No slaver
was sentence to death for violating the United States slave trade laws until
1862.53 Even in 1862, President Lincoln writes “a large number of
respectable citizens have earnestly besought me to commute the said
45

HEAD, supra note 42.
Infra Part II.
47
Infra Part III.
48
Id.
49
Dinizulu Gene Tinnie, The Slaving Brig Henriqueta and Her Evil Sisters: A Case
Study in the 19th-Century Illegal Slave Trade to Brazil, 93(4) J. AFRICAN AM. HIST. 509,
512 (2008); HEAD, supra note 42.
50
Ralph Clayton, Baltimore's African Slave Trade Connection, BALTIMORE CHRON. &
SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 2002, http://baltimorechronicle.com/slaveship_apr02.shtml.
51
Infra Part IV.B. (One of the Government’s witnesses testified that Gooding told one
of his creditors that he would pay him half of what he owned the creditor based on the
profits of the Africans transport to Cuba to be in sold into slavery).
52
W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1638-1870, 128-30 (1896) (Noting that President
Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, and Jackson all pardoned captured and convicted
slavers).
53
Id. at 123 (“A somewhat more sincere and determined effort to enforce the slavetrade laws now followed; and yet it is a significant fact that not until Lincoln's
administration did a slave-trader suffer death for violating the laws of the United States.”);
Lincoln on the Execution of a Slave Trader, 1862 THE GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/american-civilwar/resources/lincoln-execution-slave-trader-1862 (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
46
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sentence of the said Nathaniel Gordon54 to a term of imprisonment for
life”.55 Additionally, the upfront cost of investing in privateering disincentivized investors, like John Gooding, from pulling out of the industry,
and incentivized a morally vacuous focus on profits.56 Privateers, also
motivated by money, engaged in these missions to Africa to traffic slaves
with little moral hesitation. This drive for money is what allowed privateers
to fight for America’s freedom in the War of 1812, and take African’s
freedom by capturing them for sale into slavery.
Moral apathy and greed influenced the means and methods used in
transporting Africans being sold into slavery. The conditions on these ships
were horrific, because the White slavers viewed the Africans as a
commodity, similar to how one might view cattle. The amount of slaves a
ship could carry directly affected the profitability of a voyage for a
privateer.57 Privateers would only tend to the basic needs of the captured
African’s, and do the bare minimum to keep them alive to be sold into
slavery. One witness on a slave ship noted, “human beings … wedged
together … in low cells three feet high … [t]he heat of these horrid places
was so great, and the [smell] so offensive, that it was quite impossible to
enter them.58 Moral apathy towards captured Africans was driven by
dehumanization of the African captured into slavery. The quest to maximize
the profitability of voyages drove that dehumanization.
U.S. Navy warships and Revenue Service cutters interdicted the
slave trade.59 Captured United States ships preparing for, or engaging in the
See United States v. Gordon, 25 F. Cas. 1364 (1861), aff’d, ex parte United States v.
Gordon, 66 U.S. 503 (1862) (Nathaniel Gordon was the only slave trader ever hanged
under the slave trade acts).
55
Lincoln on the Execution of a Slave Trader, 1862 THE GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/american-civilwar/resources/lincoln-execution-slave-trader-1862 (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
56
HEAD, supra note 42 (“A fine, fully-equipped vessel with new sails and spars, a full
complement of cannon, small arms, swords, and stink pots, and dozens of men who liked to
eat and drink in between actions all made owning a privateer a capital intensive venture. In
his study of War of 1812 privateering from Baltimore , Jerome Garitee estimates that the
typical privateer in that conflict cost $40,000 when fully equipped, armed, and
provisioned… Few Baltimoreans, then, had the resources for privateering. In 1810, Garitee
estimates, there were some 3,500 people among Baltimore ’s 46,000 inhabitants with assets
of at least $4,000 and only some 400 people with assets of $15,000 or more”).
57
See note 203 and accompanying text.
58
Rev. Robert Walsh, Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829, vol 2, 469-71 (London,
1830).
59
See generally The Plattsburgh, 23 U.S. 133, 134 (1825); U.S. COAST GUARD
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, https://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/h_USCGhistory.asp (last
visited Dec. 28, 2016) (“In 1794 cutters were charged with preventing the introduction of
new slaves from Africa. By the Civil War, cutters captured numerous slavers and freed
almost 500 slaves.”).
54
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slave trade, were judicially condemned, and the ship was subject to
forfeiture.60 The United States legally had the authority to capture privateer
ships engaged in the slave trade, but enforcement efforts by the United
States were sporadic.61 While the United States passed laws to eliminate the
importation of slaves, it also was not willing to robustly enforce those
laws.62 Tragically, even when the United States did capture a ship
sometimes it would be sent to a slave-holding state, and the captured
Africans would still be illegally enslaved.63 If the international slave trade
was morally reprehensible than it seems irrational that the United States
would not commit more resources to fighting the illegal slave trade in
Africa. Or at the very least ensure that those Africans illegally captured did
not become slaves once they arrived in the United States.64
PART II: BALTIMORE’S ROLE IN THE SLAVE TRADE AND UNITED STATES
V. GOODING.
A. Baltimore’s role in the slave trade
Baltimore played a major role in both the national and international
slave trade. Baltimore was a victim of its geography and topography
because the city was centrally located and was known for having an
excellent Harbor.65 Surprisingly, Baltimore was a major hub for the
domestic slave trade, but by 1810, the city also had one of the largest free
African American populations in the United Sates.66 Between 1790 and
1859, estimations suggest that one million slaves were “sold south” from
60

Infra Part III.
W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, supra note 52, at 125 (“The first United States cruise
arrives on the African Coast in March 1820 and remained a “few weeks;” that since then
four others had in two years made five visits in all; but “since the middle of last November,
the commencement of the healthy season on that coast, no vessel has been, nor as your
committee is informed, is, under orders for the service.”).
62
Id.
63
Id. (“Again, it is asserted that “when vessels engaged in the slave trade have been
detained by the American cruisers, and sent into the slave-holding states, there appears at
once a difficulty in securing the freedom to these captives which the laws of the United
States have decreed for them.”).
64
Id.
65
Richard Clayton, A Bitter Inner Harbor Legacy: The Slave Trade, BALT. SUN, July
12, 2000, articles.baltimoresun.com/2000-07-12/news/0007120236_1_slave-pens-prattstreet-slave-trade (Interstate traders in the domestic coast slave trade found Baltimore's
excellent harbor, central location and position in the midst of a developing "selling market"
attractive incentives in which to build their slave pens and base their operations near the
bustling port).
66
See generally RALPH CLAYTON, CASH FOR BLOOD: THE BALTIMORE TO NEW
ORLEANS DOMESTIC SLAVE TRADE (Heritage Books Inc. 2002).
61
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Maryland and Virginia in the domestic slave trade, with no regard to family
ties.67 The domestic slave trade was legal, and it was common for slaves
“sold south” from Baltimore to be sent to southern ports; like New Orleans
for sale, because there was a higher demand for free slave labor in the
South.68Baltimore was a ‘sellers’ market for slave traders because it relied
less on slave labor than it had pre-Revolution, which meant more people
were willing to sell their slaves.69 Benjamin Lundy, an abolitionist and
Quaker, in 1825 described Baltimore wharves as being like "the coast of
Africa... hardened freebooters and traffickers of human flesh, who have so
long disgraced human nature by their infamous and 'piratical' practices.”70
Downtown Baltimore had many slave pens used to temporarily house
enslaved Black people.71 Enslaved Blacks were put in slave pens when
there slave owners visited Baltimore, or when the Black person was being
sold by an owner who felt the enslaved Black person had a propensity to
run.72
One of Baltimore’s most successful slavers was Austin Woolfork.
Woolfork operated one of the largest, and most lucrative slave trade
operations in the country out of Baltimore.73 Woolfork relied on catch
phrases like “Cash for Negroes” in newspaper ads to build his slave trading
empire.74 Woolfolk focused on the legal domestic slave trade routes and
dominated the market. For example in May June and July of 1825,
Woolfolk was responsible for seventy percent of the domestic slave trade in
Baltimore.75 Woolfork also was one of the first slave traders to use slave
pens in Baltimore.76 Woolfolk’s strangle hold on the legal domestic slave
trade in Baltimore may explain why some merchants, like Gooding, would
67

Scot Shane, The Secret History of City Slave Trade, BALT. SUN, June 20, 1999,
articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-06-20/topic/9906220293_1_slave-trade-buy-slaves-slaveswere-sold.
68
CLAYTON, supra note 66.
69
CALVIN SCHERMERHORN, THE BUSINESS OF SLAVERY AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM, 1815-1860, 33-68 (Yale University Press, 2015).
70
Id.
71
Richard Clayton, A Bitter Inner Harbor Legacy: The Slave Trade, BALT. SUN, July
12, 2000, articles.baltimoresun.com/2000-07-12/news/0007120236_1_slave-pens-prattstreet-slave-trade.
72
Scot Shane, The Secret History of City Slave Trade, BALT. SUN, June 20, 1999,
articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-06-20/topic/9906220293_1_slave-trade-buy-slaves-slaveswere-sold.
73
SCHERMERHORN, supra note 69, at 33-68.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
CLAYTON, supra note 71 (“One of the first major pens was built behind a white
frame house near the corner of Cove and Pratt streets, near the intersection of what is today
Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard. The pen belonged to Tennessee native Austin Woolfolk,
whose reign in Baltimore ran from 1818 to 1841.”).
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pursue the illegal international route. At the very least Baltimore’s robust
domestic slave trade, market provided moral cover for merchants like John
Gooding.77

Figure 2: The slave pen near the corner of Cove (Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard)
and Pratt streets. 78

John Gooding79, Woolfork, and others maintained a very active
slave trade market, but that was not the city’s only claim to fame with
respect to the slave trade. Many recognized the Port of Baltimore as the best
place to build a ship for the illegal international slave trade. Baltimore-built
ships sailed from the Port of Baltimore, taking part in the illegal
international slave trade, as late as 1861.80 The illegality of the international
slave trade after 1808 makes it difficult to determine, with certainty, how
many ships were built, or left the port of Baltimore to engage in the
international slave trade. However, based on the regularity in which
77
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Baltimore ships were captured it seems clear that Baltimore ships played a
significant role in facilitating the illegal trade.81
Baltimore ships had a reputation for being fast lightweight ships that
could travel between ten to twelve knots, compared to merchant ships that
would only travel five knots.82A fast ship meant a quicker voyage and a
quick get away from ships patrolling the seas for illegal slave ships. In
1835, well after the United States outlawed the production of slave ships in
United States ports, a British Commissioner at Sierra Leone complained
“the vessels now building at Baltimore for the slave trade [were] of the
fastest-sailing model which their skill and ingenuity could devise.”83 An
1840’s report found that fifty two percent of the slave vessels captured in
the spring and summer of 1839 were Baltimore built.84 Baltimore ships
were so commonly captured in the illegal slave trade that one reporter, who
could not determine where a seized ship originated, simply wrote that he
assumed “[i]t was probably Baltimore built”.85
Ships suspected of being built for the international slave trade, risked
forfeiture under the 1807 Act.86 Yet, Baltimore's shipbuilders, lured by
potential high profits, continued building vessels used to kidnap Africans
for sale into slavery decades past that date suggesting that the reward was
worth the risk. For example, in December 1839, the Government seized the
Ann in Fell Point (located in Baltimore) because they suspected that the ship
was being fitted to engage in the African Slave Trade.87 Cunning merchants
built their ships in Baltimore and retrofitted them else where, which is
precisely what the indictment in United States v. Gooding suggested John
Gooding did with the General Winder.88
B. Baltimore’ response to Gooding’s indictment
Gooding’s prosecution and trial received considerable publicity; with
some Baltimore lawyers going so far as to lobby President John Quincy
Adams to abort the trial.89 Adam’s recounted that there was a petition from
81
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Gooding himself requesting that a [nolle] prosequi be entered, which was
supported by “respectable citizens of Baltimore”, because of Gooding’s
contributions during the War of 1812 as a financier of privateering ships.90
Many Baltimoreans expressed sympathy for Gooding because they believed
he only engaged in the international slave trade to support his family and
stave off bankruptcy.91 Tragically and ironically, that same sympathy was
not extended to the people that Gooding sold into slavery.
President Adams recounted several attempts by prominent Baltimoreans
to persuade him to discontinue the prosecution of Gooding. Mr. Wilson, one
of Gooding’s attorneys, attempted to convince Adams to intervene on
behalf of Gooding, because he believed that the witnesses for the trial were
going to provide false testimony against Gooding.92 Jonathan D. Meredith, a
respected attorney in Baltimore and legal consultant for both the Bank of
Baltimore and the local branch of the Bank of the United States, requested
that Adams discontinue the prosecution of Gooding by again reminding
Adams that Gooding “was a warm patriot in the late war with Great
Brittan.”93 Adams also noted that General Leakin, who eventually became
the mayor of Baltimore City, pled for executive intervention on behalf of
Gooding.94 Even members of Congress wanted Adams to end the
prosecution.95
Despite immense pressure, Adams refused to interfere with the
prosecution of Gooding. Adams did not stop the prosecution in part,
because there were people also petitioning Adams not to interfere, though
he does not document who these people are in his memoirs.96 Personally,
Adams believed “the Executive should not arrest the arm of the law” and
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that a jury was in the best position to determine if Gooding was guilty.97
Noticeably, no one who pled for Adams to step in on Gooding’s behalf
suggested that Gooding was innocent. Many prominent Baltimoreans knew
that Gooding was guilty of illegally engaging in the slave trade, yet still
believed that he should not be punished.
PART III: THE PIECEMEAL ROAD TO THE SLAVE TRADE ACT OF 1818
Racialized slavery of African Americans was a common and legal
practice until the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery in 1865, well
after the United States formally prohibited it’s involvement in the
international slave trade in 1807.98 In United States v. Gooding, the
Supreme Court examines if John Gooding specifically violated the 1818
Act, based on the Governments indictment.99 However, the 1818 Act is one
of many acts in the late seventeen hundreds, and early eighteen centuries
that the United States Congress passed to limit, and eventually restrict
United States’ citizen involvement in the international slave trade.100 The
United States Constitution, which prohibited a ban on the slave trade until
1808, hamstrung the 1794 Act, and the other acts that followed, until
Congress could regulate the trade.
A. The regulatory path to significantly limiting the United States’
involvement in the slave trade ultimately proved ineffective and plagued
with loopholes.
The 1818 Act is a progeny of Congress’ first attempt to limit the
United States involvement in the international slave trade, the Slave Trade
Act of 1794.101 The 1794 Act, signed by the first president of the United
States George Washington, was the countries first attempt to
constitutionally limit the United States involvement in the international
slave trade.102 The 1794 Act focused exclusively on vessels engaged in the
international slave trade, and prohibited the use of United States shipyards
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to build or fit a ship with fitments, for the international slave trade. 103 The
1794 Act relied on two enforcement mechanisms. First the act required that
all ships sailing from Africa “give bond with sufficient sureties, to the
treasurer of the United States, that none of the natives of Africa, or any
other foreign country or place, shall be taken on board... to be transported,
or sold as slaves in any other foreign place, within nine months
thereafter.”104 This was an attempt to ensure that every ship was
affirmatively aware of the law, and complied. Second, if one was found to
be in violation of the act their ship could be confiscated by the United
States, and any informant that provided information that led to the
confiscation could collect half of the fines.105 This incentivized “ship
captains and mariners to monitor the activities of anyone they suspected of
being involved in the illegal slave trade”.106
The 1794 Act had a limited effect on the United States’ overt
participation in the international slave trade until 1800, when Georgia and
South Carolina resumed their participation in the international slave trade,
by accepting slaves from Africa.107 South Carolina started to import slaves
from Africa, in violation of the 1794 and 1800 Acts, between 1803 and
1807, which upset the federal government and the Northern states.108 South
Carolina found a ban impossible to enforce. Five hours after legalizing the
importation of slaves, two British ships sailed into Charleston with
slaves.109 Until the 1807 Act went into effect in 1808, many still smuggled
captured Africans into the United States to be sold as slaves.110
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In 1800, Congress passed the Slave Trade Act of 1800 (“1800 Act”),
in an attempt to addressed flaw in the 1794 Act.111 While the 1794 Act was
effective at regulating the vessels involved in the international slave trade, it
did nothing to stop United States citizens from investing in the trade. The
1800 Act focused primarily on citizen involvement in the international slave
trade. The 1800 Act made it unlawful for any citizen of the United States to
invest in a vessel that participated in the international slave trade. 112 The
penalty was “a sum of money equal to double the value of the right or
property in such vessel”.113 This meant that United States citizens could no
longer invest in any vessel engaged in the slave trade, even if it was legally
allowed on a non-U.S. ship by another country.114 The 1800 Act further
added to the restrictions imposed by the 1794 Act by prohibiting any United
States citizen from residing or serving on any vessel that engaged in the
international slave trade regardless of if the ship originated from a United
States port.115
The United States’ final attempt to regulate the international slave
trade was the Slave Trade Act of 1803 (“1803 Act”).116 This final regulatory
act attempted to address the actual import—people from Africa. The act
again tinkered with the fines for violating the act, and clarified that “negro,
mulatto, or other person of color” imported as indentured servants were
considered slaves.117 This 1803 Act demonstrates how nefarious and
determined United States merchants were to continue to engage in the
importation of slaves from Africa.
B. The 1807 prohibition, and its amendments, were more robust, but equally
as ineffective at dissuading United States merchants from engaging in the
lucrative international slave trade.
In 1807, with the end to the 1808 prohibition looming, Congress
passed the 1807 Act, which prohibited any new slaves from being imported
to the United States.118 The new act definitively stated “it shall not be
lawful to import or bring into the United States…from any foreign
kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person of color, with
intent to hold, sell, or dispose … as a slave”.119 The 1807 Act carried the
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largest penalties to date of up to twenty thousand dollars for anyone found
to be building or fitting a ship for the slave trade, up to ten thousand dollars,
and a jail term of five to ten years for Americans found on a ship importing
slaves.120 Anyone who purchased an illegally imported slave would have to
forfeit said slave, and pay an eight thousand dollar penalty for every
illegally imported slave.121 The 1807 Act also authorized the navy to
interdict ships involved with the slave trade that were in United States ports
or off the United States Coast.122 The 1807 Act was the first act not
confined by the 1808 compromise, making it naturally the United States
Federal Government’s most thorough rebuke of the international slave
trade.
Congress started to take action on the 1807 Act on December 16,
1805 when Senator Row Bradley, a Democrat from Vermont introduced the
bill; Barnabas Bidwell, a Congressman from Massachusetts, introduced a
similar bill in February 1806.123 Initially, the bill failed, because some
Congressman raised doubts about the constitutionality of passing the bill
before 1808, even if the bill did not take effect until January 1, 1808.124
However, after President Thomas Jefferson assured Congress on December
2, 1806 that passing the bill, to take effect on January 1, 1808 was
constitutional, Bradley gave notice that he planned to re-introduce his bill
on December 3, 1806.125
Many Congressmen agreed with the bill in theory but disagreed with
the details.126 The debate on the bill was most contentious with respect to,
what to do with people from Africa brought illegally to America, and what
the penalty should be for violating the law.127 The North and South were
divided on what to do with the Africans brought illegally to America.
Southern states were concerned with the idea of having free Africans in the
South, which they thought risk confusion and a slave revolt, while Northern
States were concerned that if the United States sold the illegally imported
120
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slaves than the United States would be participating in the slave trade.128
Eventually Congress decided to side step the issue completely and let each
state decide what to do with the captured illegally imported Africans.129
On the matter of the penalty, there was still a North/South divide but
the divide centered more on issues of morality. Congressman John Simlie of
Pennsylvania argued that the penalty for the crime of illegally importing
slaves into the United States should be death, but many in the South
believed that position was not practical, and argued the slavery is not
morally reprehensible in the South and therefore should not warrant
death.130 The 1807 Act did not carry a penalty of death but penalties were
severe.
In 1818, Congress passed a new act, amending the 1807 Act.131 The
1818 Act passed with little debate by Congress.132 The new law decreased
the penalties for various offenses.133 Section three and four of the 1818 Act
lowered the penalty for violating the act to a fine between one and five
thousand dollars, and a prison term between three and seven years.134 The
1818 Act’s penalties also now applied to everyone equally regardless of
their role in the international slave trade.135 Finally, the 1818 Act lowered
the penalty for purchasing an imported slave to one thousand dollars and
provided an exemption to the forfeiture clause of the act for “any regulation
by any legislature of any state”.136 The penalties for violating the 1818 Act
were significantly watered down, however the penalties were still
significant; five thousand dollars in 1818 is the equivalent to over seventy
eight thousand dollars in 2015.137
The 1818 Act was not a completely watered down version of the
1807 Act. The 1818 Act shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant to “prove that the negro or mulatto, or person of colour, which he
or they shall be charged with have being brought into the United States, or
with purchasing ... was brought into the United States at least five years
previous to the commencement of the prosecution.”138 Under the new act,
someone in possession of an African slave now had to prove how he
acquired the slave. The “African-ness” of the enslaved individual would be
128
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prima facie evidence that the owner had to produce evidence to refute.
While this shifting of the burden was the only real enhancement over the
1818 Act, even that came with a new statute of limitations provision,
limiting prosecution under the act.
Putting the rationale or justifications aside, Congress attempted to
close the African slave trade in the United States many times, and learned
from the shortcomings of previous attempts to close the trade. With each
piece of new legislation, Congress did move closer to ending the African
slave trade.139 By 1818, Congress had closed the trade to all but the most
determined merchants who engaged in the African slave trade, like John
Gooding a merchant from Baltimore, Maryland.
PART IV: UNITED STATES V. GOODING AND ITS EFFECTS
In United States v. Gooding,140 the United States Supreme Court’s
ruling was substantively important, because of the Marshall Court’s stance
on the 1818 Act; and procedurally important because of the Marshall
Court’s ruling on the evidence issue presented at trial. The Government
formally charged, John Gooding, the criminal defendant in the case, for
violating the 1818 Act, however Gooding escaped charges because of an
imperfect indictment.141
The Government’s theory of the case, if true, shows how resolved
Gooding was to profit from the international slave trade.142 The
Government first alleged that Gooding purchased the General Winder,
while still under construction in the Port of Baltimore from William
McElderry.143 Next they alleged that Gooding paid to have the ship
completed, and appointed Captain John Hill to supervise the process.144 The
Government further alleged that materials to fit the General Winder for the
slave trade were shipped to the Port of Baltimore on another ship chartered
139
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by Gooding, the Pocahontas.145 The General Winder left the Port of
Baltimore for St. Thomas in the West Indies on August 21, 1824, with the
Pocahontas following shortly thereafter in September.146 Finally, Once both
ships were in St. Thomas the Government believed the General Winder was
retrofitted for, and employed to engage in the African Slave trade.147
The Government did not get to prosecute the case against Gooding
because in a move typically reserved for a courtroom drama on television,
Gooding’s attorney, Roger B. Taney (who would later become the Chief
Justice for the United States Supreme Court) argued in open court, in front
of the jury, that the indictment was defective. 148 Taney further argued that
the indictment should be quashed because the crimes Gooding was charged
with were un-indictable offenses.149 Interestingly, Taney had already
unsuccessfully motion to quash the indictment in a pre-trial motion.150 Since
the motion to quash the indictment had already failed, it seems like Taney’s
revival of the issue was a ploy for the jury, and not an attempt to persuade
the judges to rethink their ruling. The procedure for ruling on pre-trial
motions during that time is unknown, and the lower court record does not
cite which judge ruled on the motion. Therefore, it is unclear if one judge or
both judges ruled on the first motion. However, both judges were listed as
being present when the motion to quash was argued.151 If only one judge
ruled on the previously denied motion, Taney’s revival of his argument that
the indictment was defective may have been intentional to create the
division of opinion between the judges. If this was Taney’s strategy, it
seems peculiar that the Court would contemplate a motion already ruled on
earlier. However, in an equally rare move, District Court Judge Glenn, and
Associate Supreme Court Justice Duvall decided to suspend the proceeding,
dismiss the jury and file a certificate of division to the Supreme Court to
resolve their division of opinion before they continued.152
A. The lower court ruling and the insurmountable “division of opinion”.
The Circuit Court for the District of Maryland for the Fourth Circuit,
in Baltimore City, sent the transcript of the proceedings in United States v.
Gooding to the Supreme Court on December 8, 1826.153 The transcript list
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Elias Glenn, the Judge for the District Court of Maryland at the time, and
Supreme Court Associate Justice Gabriel Duvall, riding circuit, as presiding
over the case.154 Justice Duvall was born and Maryland, politically active,
both locally and nationally, and served as Chief Justice to the Maryland
General Court before becoming an Associate Justice to the Supreme
Court.155 Given Duvall’s ties to Maryland it would make sense that he
would be riding circuit in Baltimore.156 Justice Duvall does not stand out for
his work as an Associate Justice in the Supreme Court, in part, because of
how Justice Marshall ran the court and authored the majority of the
opinions.157 However, Duvall often would ride circuit and preside in circuit
court cases. Before Glenn sat on the bench, he was the U.S. Attorney for
Maryland.158 President James Monroe appointed Glenn to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland on December 16, 1824 and Glenn
remained on the bench until April 1, 1836, when he resigned because of
failing health.159 In an interesting full circle moment, as Glenn was leaving
the bench one of his last official acts as a judge was administering the oath
to Roger B. Taney, the newly appointed Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court.160
The record also listed Nathaniel Williams, the United States
Attorney who prosecuted John Gooding, and Paul Bentalou, as a
Marshal.161 Williams was the United States Attorney for the District of
Maryland from 1824 until 1841, so this was one of his earlier cases during
his tenure.162 Bentalou was the U.S. Marshall for the District of Maryland
154
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from 1817 until his death on September 26, 1826 from a fall in a
warehouse.163 Bentalou was alive when the proceedings began, but he was
deceased before the lower court record was produced for the Supreme
Court, so it is unclear why he was listed.164
The transcript of the record prepared for the Supreme Court
summarizes the case presented to the grand jury as:
[I]quiring for the body of the District of Maryland,
upon their oaths do present John Gooding, Merchant
of the City of Baltimore was interested in a vessel
called the General Winder, which vessel left the Port
of Baltimore some times on or about the month of
September in the year 1824 and which vessel was and
has been engaged in the African slave trade under
some other name, and that the said John Gooding was
interested in the traffic thus carried in violation of the
laws of the United States in such case made in
provide165
The grand jury was impaneled to hear the case during the Circuit Court’s
May term on May 12, 1826. As all grand juries of the time the panel
consisted of all men, presumably white, with Tobias E. Stansbury, a veteran
of the American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, as the jury
foremen.166
During the first day of the grand jury hearing in May 1826 William
Parris, T.W. Hayes, John Patrick, Captain Michael Brown of the
Pocahontas, William Ridgeway, Barney L. Lynch (the ship joiner at point),
Emanuel Carr, Buck Hendricks, Rueben Rofs, Isaiah Maniker, and John
Clean were listed as witness.167 The record does not list what testimony
each witness provided, but the Government seemed to have a solid case
against Mr. Gooding for violating the 1818 Act. The Government had both
a captain of one of the ships alleged to be involved in Gooding’s violation,
and a ship maker who may have fitted the General Winder set to testify
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during the hearing.168 Captain Michael Brown, of the Pocahontas, could
have provided testimony about what involvement Gooding had in preparing
the General Winder with fitments for the slave trade, and how the
Pocahontas was involved with Gooding’s plot to engage in the international
slave trade.169 As a ship joiner is it unclear exactly what testimony Lynch
could provide for the grand jury.170 As a ship joiner by trade Lynch had
worked on the design and interior of ships, so Lynch could provide expert
testimony based on his experience as a ship joiner or he could provide direct
testimony about the interior work he did for the General Winder.171

Figure 3: Iron mask, collar, leg shackles, and spurs used to restrict slaves172

Nathan Williams, representing the Government, laid out a thorough
seven-count indictment against Gooding for violating the Slave Trade Act
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of 1818. The Government presented a seven-count indictment to the grand
jury alleged first that Gooding “fit out, for himself as owner, in the Port of
Baltimore…the General Winder with the intent to employ the said vessel…
in procuring Negros from… Africa to be transported… to the Island of
Cuba… to be sold as slaves”.173 Count two and three of the indictment
charged that Gooding, as the owner of the General Winder, “did…send
away from the Port of Baltimore…the General Winder with the intent to
employ… the General Winder in procuring Negros from a foreign
country”.174 Moreover, that Gooding “did aid in fitting in the Port of
Baltimore the General Winder with intent that said vessel should be
employed in procuring Negros from a foreign country”.175 Count four of the
indictment focused more on Gooding’s ship, the General Winder’s direct
involvement with the slave trade and alleged that Gooding did, “abet the
taking on board, from one of the coast of Africa… divers Negros, two wit
two hundred and ninety, not being inhabitants… either of the States or
territories… for the purpose of selling such Negros as slaves”.176 Count five
and six alleged, that the General Winder, did “sail from the Port of
Baltimore… the General Winder, with the intent that the said vessel…
should be employed in the procuring of Negros from a foreign country… to
be sold as slaves”; and that Gooding “did for himself as owner cause to be
sent away from the port of Baltimore…the General Winder with intent that
the vessel… should be employed in procuring Negros from a foreign
country.177 The final count seemed to draw from the prior six counts of the
indictment, and alleged that Gooding “for himself or for other persons as
factors, fit out, equip, load[ed] or otherwise prepare… The General Winder
in the Port of Baltimore… with intent that the said ship… should be
employed in procuring Negros from a foreign country.178
Gooding’s affidavit is where the Government’s case started to
unravel. A team of lawyers including, Roger B. Taney, S. Heath, Charles
Mitchell John Glenn Upton, and Mr. Wilson, represented Gooding.179
William Writ, the Attorney General during Gooding’s trial, wrote Henry
Clay noting that Gooding was represented by five of the “most eminent
counsel at the bar” and “requested that other counsel be employed to assist
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the district attorney.”180 Through his team of lawyers Gooding denied the
charges in an affidavit where he stated he:
[W]as not the owner of the General Winder, nor in
anyway interested in the said vessel at the time whilst
she was engaged, or employed or prepared for or
sent away, or equipped, loaded, or fitted out in any
illegal trade or traffic, and especially the slave trade
from the Port of Baltimore, or any port in the United
States…did not for himself as owner, nor for any
other person or persons at time fit out, or send away,
or cause to sail, or equip or load, or otherwise prepare
said vessel or cause any of the said acts to be done,
nor aid, nor abet the same with the intent to employ
the said vessel in the slave trade or any other
unlawful trade.181
Gooding did not take a definitive stance on the General Winder’s
involvement in the slave trade in his affidavit. Instead, Gooding argued that
if the General Winder did participate in the slave trade he had no interest in
the matter, and did not authorize the ship’s involvement. Also embedded in
Gooding’s affidavit was the denial of any intent to engage in the illegal
slave trade, a point that would eventually lead to the undoing of the
indictment. Gooding denied all the charges in the indictment with respect to
the “intent to employ”. Gooding’s affidavit also did not address any
allegations about the fitments for the slave trade he had shipped on the
Pocahontas.
Gooding’s argument that he was not “interested” in the General
Winder seems difficult to prove because he did own the ship, and there is no
proof that Gooding was not the owner and principal of the ship. Gooding
goes further in his affidavit to affirmatively argue that:
The said vessel was built, equipped and fitted out in
Baltimore as a lawful merchant vessel or ship, and
employed and intended to be employed in a lawful
trade and business, and was regularly fitted out or
equip, prepared, loaded and cleared with a lawful and
ordinary cargo for the West Indies and was in no way
equipped as an African trading vessel in the port of
180
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Baltimore or elsewhere …and was never engaged in
the said business whilst this defendant and traverser
was in any way interested in her, or acted as agent or
other wise respecting the said vessel182
It is unclear what evidence Gooding would have presented demonstrating
that the General Winder was never fitted for the slave trade. However, again
Gooding makes a nuanced claim that he was never interested in the ship
while, it was ever engaged in the slave trade, which seems to be difficult to
prove at trial.
While the Government provided many witnesses to build their case,
Gooding’s affidavit only provided two, Mr. Jacob Waters and John
Patrick.183 Waters and Patrick were both agents at the Custom House at the
Port of Baltimore that Gooding proffered would provide the “outward
manifest” for the General Winder and the Pocahontas.184 An outward
manifest would provide information like the ships name and owner, the
cargo, and the ports the ship is visiting.185 If the witnesses Gooding
provided could only speak to the outward manifest he provided than neither
witness was very helpful, because an outward manifest did not rebut the
Government’s charge that the General Winder was used to transport slaves
from Africa to Cuba.186 At best, Waters and Patrick could only testify to
what official papers Gooding filed with the customs house. While that
evidence would corroborate Gooding’s defense, it would not be compelling
evidence to over come the Government’s theory of the case. If Gooding
participated in the illegal slave trade than he would have also submitted
false paper work to get approval for his voyage. Moreover, the Government
was already prepared to prove that Gooding was the mastermind behind the
plan to fit the General Winder for the slave trade.187
While Waters and Patrick did not appear to be the best witnesses,
they were excellent justifications to postpone Gooding’s trial, because they
both prepared the outward manifest for the General Winder and the
Pocahontas, they both were out of the country, and the outward manifest to
both ships were lost.188 Gooding argued that they both were essential to his
defense and would be present for the December term of the court, therefore
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the court granted Gooding’s motion for a continuance, and the case was
reschedule for December 8, 1826.189
Gooding’s motions are what brought the trial to a stand still. On
December 19, 1826 when Williams presented and filed the indictment,
Gooding entered a plea, before the jury was sworn in to hear the case.190
However, on Saturday, December 23, 1826, Gooding withdrew his plea and
filed a motion to quash the indictment.191 The court denied the motion on
December 26, and Gooding entered a plea of not guilty to the first sixcounts of the indictment, and he challenged the seventh count.192
Gooding, represented by Roger Taney among others, made several
arguments in the motion to quash the indictment.193 First, Gooding argued
that the 1818 Act for which he was being indicted “requires a special
remedy pointed out and proscribed” that the indictment does not support. 194
This suggested that Gooding believed that he should only be forced to
forfeit the ship under section two of the 1818 Act as the owner of the
General Winder.195 Second, in pleading before the court, Gooding argued
that he is not guilty on the first six counts in the indictment, and not
required to respond to the seventh count because it “wants form…charges
all the offenses in the alternative… charges more than one offense in the
same count… and…is in other respects unclear, informal, and
insufficient.”196 The Government only argued that they could prove the
seventh count, and noted that in not responding to the seventh count
Gooding did not deny the charges.197 The court sided with Gooding and
quashed the seventh indictment198
The Court proceedings were again delayed over the evidence
presented.199 The Government presented evidence from an unnamed witness
189
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who said he heard Gooding say that he successfully delivered two hundred
and ninety slaves to Cuba.200 Another unnamed witness said that he heard
Gooding telling a creditor that he would pay half his debt once the General
Winder arrived in Cuba.201 Finally, on December 30, 1826 the Government
offered testimony from Captain Peter L. Coit.202 Captain Coit was the
prosecution’s star witness, because Coit’s testimony could prove that
Gooding knowingly employed the General Winder in the international slave
trade. Coit alleged that Captain Hill offered him “seventy dollars per month
and five dollars per head for every prime slave which should be brought to
Cuba” to join him on as a crew member of the General Winder.203 A
skeptical Coit asked Captain Hill how he would pay the crew it there was a
disaster and Hill replied “Uncle John”.204 Gooding objected to the
admission of Coit’s testimony.205
The division of opinion between Judge Glenn and Associate Justice
Duvall initially was over whether Captain Coit’s testimony was
admissible.206 The Circuit Court deliberated for four days before deciding
that only the Supreme Court could resolve their division of opinion.207 Even
though Coit’s testimony was the impetus for the division, the court enlarged
the division of opinion to clarify issues with the indictment, even though
those issues were address through motions the court already denied.208 It is
unclear where either Associate Justice Duvall or Judge Glenn disagreed on
the seven issues enumerated in their division of opinion. The minutes for
the Circuit Court of Maryland recorded the evidence issue with Coit’s
testimony but it does not list the other issues that would eventually come
before the court.209 Perhaps Associate Justice Duvall and District Court
Judge Glenn did have a genuine issue with the evidence issue but they
already address them with the indictment.210 Given the transcript of the
lower court proceeding, and the minutes it is fair to assume that there was
no genuine division of opinion on the indictment, rather, the issues with the
200
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indictment were included with the certificate of division out of an
abundance of caution.
B. The Supreme Court’s ruling and reprimand
The case came before the Supreme Court during the January term
shortly after they received the transcript.211 The Supreme Court heard
arguments from the Government, represented by William Writ, the United
States Attorney General; Mr. Coxe; Roger Taney and Clarence Mitchell
represented Gooding.212 Oral argument for the case lasted three days with
the first argument began on March 12, 1827 and the final argument
concluded on March 14, 1827.213
In writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story started his
opinion by diminishing some of the issues that the Court was asked to
resolve.214 Story noted “[c]ases of real doubt and difficulty, or of extensive
consequence as to principle and application, and furnishing matter for very
grave deliberation … appeal to this Court upon certificates of division”.215
Justice Story’s prelude before addressing the substantive legal issues in
Gooding reminded the lower courts about the role of the Supreme Court’s
appellate review. Justice Story’s concern was that the Circuit Court for
Maryland did not deliberate or make a judgment on some of the issues
offered for appellate review, and instead asked the Supreme Court to
resolve the issues like a court of original jurisdiction.216 Story’s opinion
suggested that the Supreme Court should not address flaws in the
indictment, if a motion to quash the indictment would resolve the issue,
specifically the first six counts of the indictment.217 Story used Gooding to
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remind lower courts that the Supreme Court’s appellate review should be
used judiciously, and not wantonly.218
In dicta, Story also warned that allowing a criminal defendant an
unchecked right to appeal to the Supreme Court rises to the level of
“obstruction of justice”, because he believed a division of opinion, under
the Judiciary Act of 1802219, disrupted the Court by getting into matters the
lower courts should have dealt with.220 Story was concerned about the
procedural and substantive effects of the division of opinion in Gooding.
Procedurally, Story was worried that other criminal defendants may also use
the same tactics that Taney used to create the division of opinion amongst
the two judges. Substantively, Story believed Congress created the division
of opinion processes so the Court could resolve substantive legal questions,
not procedural issues that a lower court can address, like the indictment.
Story’s concerns were reasonable given the procedural history of this
case.221
Justice Story first addressed the testimony of Captain Peter L. Coit
against Gooding.222 Justice Story, spoke for a unanimous court and declared
that Coit’s testimony was admissible against Gooding. 223 The Court was not
persuaded by Gooding’s argument that since the case was a criminal matter
the declarations made by Captain Hill, the agent and master of the General
Winder, did not bind Gooding, the principal.224 Story not only dismissed
Gooding’s distinction between civil and criminal cases, but in dicta Story
noted that even in criminal cases, “he who commands or procures a crime to
be done, if it is done, is guilty of the crime and the act is his act”.225 While
Gooding tried to focus more on the hearsay elements in Coit’s testimony,
Story instead highlighted how Coit’s testimony was not just a detached
declaration, but proof of a criminal conspiracy to profit off selling Africans
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into slavery that was financed by Gooding, and operated by Captain Hill.226
In admitting, the evidence from Coit against Gooding Story also explained
that the evidence is exempt from the hearsay rules because Captain Hill was
acting within the boundaries of his agency relationship with Gooding when
he asked Coit to join his crew, so Captain Hill’s proposition bound
Gooding.227
Next, the Court addressed issues raised in the certificate of division
not argued in the Circuit Court regarding the particularities of when the
Government could prosecute for violating the 1818 Act.228 First, the Court
addressed if the statute required the Government to prove that Gooding
himself fit the ship with tools for the international slave trade. Story relied
on the plain meaning of the 1818 Act, and common sense, to quickly
dispose of this issue.229 The 1818 Act made no mention of a requirement
that the ship must be fitted solely by one person to prosecute.230 Again,
Story relied on agency theory, to explain the Court’s rationale that “[i]f
done by others under the command and direction of the owner, with his
approbation and for his benefit, it is just as much in contemplation of law
his own act as if done by himself.” In the instant case, Gooding hired
Captain Hill to supervise the fitting on the General Winder, and purchased
all the fitments for the ship, including the illegal fitment for the
international slave trade.231
Next, the Court addressed whether the statute required a ship to
completely be fitted for the slave trade to violate the 1818 Act. The court
reasoned that since “[t]he statute punishes the fitting out of a vessel with
intent to employ her in the slave trade, however innocent the equipment
may be, when designed for a lawful voyage.”232 The logic behind Story’s
226
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ruling suggested that contemplating the completeness of the fitments was
not a necessary matter to resolve to prosecute under the 1818 Act.
Finally, the Court resolved the division of opinion concerning
whether the statute required that Gooding be present when the Africans
were captured and sold into slavery to “aid” and “abet”.233 The Court holds
that the statute uses the term “aid” and “abet” in a laymen sense of the
words and means “in the common parlance, and import assistance,
cooperation, and encouragement”.234 Story gave no reason why he chose to
use the layman meaning and even notes that he chose not to rely on the
traditional criminal law meaning of “aid” and “abet”.235
The Court found that Coit’s testimony was admissible, and
constructed the statute in favor of the prosecution, however Gooding still
ultimately prevailed. The Court held that the indictment against Gooding
was “fatally defective”, because of the wording in the original
indictment.236 Story held that the Court must “give effect to every word in
every enactment if it can be done without violating the obvious intention of
the legislature”. Additionally, Story held that the 1818 Act must be
“constructed strictly” because it was a criminal statute.237 Story specifically
examined section two and three of the 1818 Act 238 and its use of the phrase
“such ship or vessel”; and argued that the phrase referred to “a ship or
vessel so built, fitted out, [etc.] in the United States or the word “such” in
the statute would have no meaning.”239 Story tried to rationalize his ruling
by declaring that “[t]here is no certainty that the legislature meant to
prohibit the sailing of any vessel on a slave voyage, which had not been
built, fitted out, [etc.] within the jurisdiction of the United States.240
Consequently, Story’s ruling meant to violate the 1818 Act the ship
must be fitted in the United States with the intent to employ the vessel in the
slave trade.241 This interpretation made the indictment “fatally defective”
233
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because; Story found that the indictment did not aver that Gooding fitted the
General Winder with fitments used in the slave trade in the United States.242
Story argued that the legislature did not intend for the act to apply to foreign
vessels fitted for the slave trade docked in the United States (intentionally
or accidentally), therefore the legislature did not intend for the act to apply
to ships fitted for the slave trade at foreign ports, because that would be
outside of the legislature’s jurisdiction.243 Because of the defects in the
indictment, the Court quashed the six-count indictment against Gooding.244
C. The Gooding retrial
The Supreme Court quashed the original indictment because of its
defects but Gooding was re-tired even though the Story’s opinion does not
formally remand the case back to the lower court.245 Gooding was
eventually re-tried on April 21, 1830.246 The Government motioned for a
continuance because of the absence of a material witness, which delayed the
trial.247 Gooding motioned that the prosecutor, who again was Nathaniel
Williams, pick which count of the indictment he was going to prosecute and
nolle prosequi the other count.248 This time the trial went much smoother.
Gooding simply pled not guilty, and based on the courts minutes the trial
lasted until April 28, 1830.249
The jury found Gooding not guilty for his involvement with the
illegal slave trade, even though many knew that Gooding illegally engaged
in the slave trade.250 Gooding’s re-trial showed that no matter how robust
the laws were against the trade a jury of Gooding’s peers (white male
property owners) were not willing to criminally convict a white man for
illegally engaging in the slave trade. The Supreme Court’s ruling on the first
indictment could never change the mind of a jury pool that was disinterested in prosecuting a prominent Baltimorean like Gooding; or worse a
jury pool that was did not think slavery was a criminal. However, Story’s
242
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construction of the 1818 Act made it easier for Gooding to escape
prosecution.251

Figure 4: Minutes from the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland 252

The Supreme Court’s ruling on the indictment made a circumstantial
case, even more difficult to prove, because of Story’s holding on the intent
element in the 1818 Act. In theory, the prosecution had a very strong case,
but on paper, the case was never easy to win. The prosecution’s best
witness, Captain Coit, was propositioned by Captain Hill to engage in the
illegal slave trade, which affects his credibility.253 Captain Coit’s
relationship to the illegal slave trade was never interrogated and remains an
unknown. Additionally, in the May 1826 term Captain Michael Brown, the
captain for the Pocahontas was listed as a witness for the grand jury
hearing, but in December after Gooding was granted a continuance Captain
Brown, was listed as a witness in Gooding’s defense.254 Since Brown was
set to testify for the defense he probably would have told the jury that the
shipments on the Pocahontas were not fitments for the slave trade.255 The
prosecution presented no evidence about the type of fitments found on the
General Winder, had no concrete proof that the General Winder transported
two hundred ninety slaves from Africa, and could never place Gooding
anywhere near the ship while it was involved in any illegal activity.256
The Supreme Court’s holding that quashed the original indictment
against Gooding made winning the case nearly impossible.257 The
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prosecution’s theory was that the General Winder left the Port of Baltimore
with fitments normally seen on ships engaged in lawful trade, and was later
retrofitted for a voyage to Africa to capture people to be sold into slavery.258
Story’s reading of the statute meant that the prosecution would have to
prove that Gooding fit the General Winder in the United States for the
illegal international slave trade, at a United States port with the intent to
engage in the international slave trade.259 Even if the Government could
prove that the General Winder was fit for the slave trade, it seems difficult
to prove that a ship was not fitted for the legal domestic slave trade.260
Story’s interpretation of the Slave Trade Act created a large loophole for
those who sought to engage in the slave trade. Furthermore, the
Government’s theory of the case was that Gooding fitted the General
Winder in St. Thomas, outside the jurisdiction of legislatures, and their
intent in passing the 1818 Act.261 Gooding’s plot to profit off capturing and
trading African people into slavery, despite laws like the 1818 Act,
exemplifies how despicable and determined merchants like John Gooding
were to profit off the pain of others.262
The Supreme Court’s ruling made it more challenging for the
Government to win its case on the merits, but merit aside this case was
always difficult to win. First, Gooding was a prominent well-respected
Baltimore merchant, making it unlikely that a jury of his literal and legal
peers would prosecute him.263 Secondly, Baltimore was a pro-slave city,
making it hard to find any jury that would criminally punish a white man
for slavery.264
D. The effects of United States v. Gooding
The practical effect of the decision was that slave traders like
Gooding were more emboldened to continue engaging in the international
slave trade.265 Also, post Gooding slave traders believed they had bonafide
loop hole they could exploit in the 1818 Act that proved strong enough to
survive Supreme Court scrutiny.266 Those that opposed the slave trade were
disappointed with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gooding, because no
258
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matter how strong Story’s logic was to justify quashing the indictment it felt
like Story was overly concerned with minor details in the indictment, at the
expense of throwing out a strong case against a well known slave trader like
Gooding. Those in favor of the slave trade were pleased with the opinion,
but were more impressed with Roger Taney’s legal acumen, because he
managed to get an indictment against a well-known slave trader quashed.267
Taney's success in Gooding was one of the reasons that President Andrew
Jackson appointed Taney as the Attorney General of the United States and
then nominated him as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.268
The holding and reasoning in Gooding has been cited in other cases
involving the 1818 Act and the international slave trade generally. In The
Garonne, similar to the reasoning in Gooding, the intent of the Slave Trade
Act was the issue. The case was about a slave who went to France for
several years with her owner and then returned to Louisiana on the Fortune
and if the slave’s return violated the 1818 Act.269 Benjamin Franklin Butler,
the United States Attorney General, relied on United States v. Gooding to
argue that because the passenger manifest listed “these two negresses are
slaves of Mr. Pecquet, and are sent to New Orleans by their master”, that it
sufficient evidence to prove that the two slaves entered the United States in
violation of the 1818 Act.270 Butler noted that in Gooding “it was decided,
that the declarations of the master of a ship, in the transactions of the vessel,
being a part of the res gestoe, are competent evidence of the voyage.”271
Chief Justice Roger Taney (who represented Gooding when facing similar
charges) looked at the legislature’s intent in passing the 1818 Act, and held
that the act “cannot be properly applied to persons of color who are
domiciled in the United States, and who are brought back to their place of
residence, after a temporary absence.”272 As Story did only a decade earlier,
Taney relied on what he thought was the legislature’s intent to narrow the
scope of the 1818 Act.
In United States v. Morris the Court examined the extraterritorial
reach of the 1800 Act and if it was necessary to actually transport slaves to
offend the statute.273 Attorney General Henry D. Gilpin argued based on
Id.
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269
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Gooding that even though the General Winder sailed from Baltimore with
out any fitments for the slave trade the Court still held that the ship was fit
out in Baltimore.274 The Court ruled that similar to how the General Winder
was fit in Baltimore based on Gooding’s alleged intent to engage in the
slave trade, in Morris because the ship was in route to the African coast to
kidnap Africans it was employed in the transportation of slaves.275 In
Morris similar to both Gooding and Garonne Taney looked at legislature
intent because “ the evident intention of the legislature ought not to be
defeated by a forced and overstrict construction.”276 However, unlike
Gooding and Garonne, in Morris the Court constructed the statute to
expand the scope of the word employ in the statute to mean “not only the
act of doing it, but also to be engaged to do it; to be under contract or orders
to do it.”277
Today the African slave trade, and all human trafficking, is illegal
everywhere in the World.278 Fortunately, the African slave trade and
racialized slavery are now just dark chapters in American history, however
part of the 1818 Act has survived in 18 U.S.C. § 1582.279 § 1582 does not
put a cap on the fine for violating the law, like the 1818 Act, but § 1582 still
only carries a maximum penalty of only seven years.280 However, based on
the federal sentencing guidelines a person would face at minimum a fortyone years prison sentence if convicted of violating § 1582281. While the law
is still current, often times the statute is only referenced as a comparison
point for similar statutes.282 While the 1818 Act is still relevant and good
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law in some respects the 1818 Act and its progeny, § 1582 are functionally
obsolete.
United States v. Gooding’s greatest legacy is the holding impacts on
criminal law.283 In Gooding, the Court held the Government could introduce
coconspirator statements from conspirators who did not testify.284 However,
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) has since superseded Gooding.285 In
Gooding, the Government wanted to use Captain Coit’s testimony to tell the
story about Gooding’s criminal conspiracy to engage in the international
slave trade.286 Similarly today, federal prosecutors can use Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) to allow witnesses to describe what coconspirators
said or did in furtherance of their criminal activity. Today, the coconspirator exception to hearsay, which was first articulated in Gooding, is
settled law to the extent there is no conflict with Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E).287 The Government lost in United States v. Gooding and
Gooding was allowed to continue operating his criminal enterprise;
however the coconspirator exemption articulated in Gooding, and further
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) significantly helps the
Department of Justice prosecute parties involved in criminal conspiracies.288
CONCLUSION
United States v. Gooding stands as a step backwards toward
condoning and legitimizing the international slave trade. Some may argue
Gooding sent a message to slavers who participated in the international
slave trade that the Supreme Court supported the Slave Trade Act of 1818,
even though Gooding escaped prosecution in part, because of the defective
indictment.289 If that was Story’s intent, than like Gooding’s indictment, the
message was defective. Post Gooding slavers had another tool in their
arsenal to escape prosecution or at best, that is what they believed.290
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Additionally, Story’s construction of the Slave trade Act of 1818 made it
more difficult to prosecute slavers. Even though merchants who chose to
ignore the law risked losing their investments and freedom there appeared
to be no political will to fully prosecute merchants like Gooding for their
involvement in the slave trade.291
United States v. Gooding’s most enduring legacy was Story’s ruling
that Captain Coit’s testimony was admissible hearsay because of the coconspirator exception, and Story’s emphasis that it was admissible because
of the agency relationship between Captain Hill and Gooding.292 One of
Gooding’s less appreciated legacies is how much Gooding did not affect the
international slave trade. The Gooding decision did little to dissuade slavers
from participating in the international slave trade—slavery proponents
celebrated the decision.293 John Gooding was never convicted for his
involvement with the international slave trade.294 If Gooding was not a step
backwards towards condoning and legitimizing the international slave trade,
it certainly was not an effective step toward ending the trade.
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APPENDIX I: JOHN GOODING
John Gooding was a wealthy Baltimore merchant and owner of
Gooding & Co.295 Gooding made his fortune investing in South American
privateering.296 During the War of 1812, Gooding collaborated with
Thomas Hutchins to invest in eleven privateers, and made $521,000.297 One
of Gooding’s largest investments was the aptly named, Mammoth. Built in
1813 for forty thousand dollars, the Mammoth was the largest privateer
schooner built in Baltimore.298 Gooding was equally well known for his
involvement in the illegal international slave trade. “He liked speculation
better than legitimate business. He did not care about sending out slavers to
the Coast of Africa, if he could double or treble his venture.”299
Gooding lived a lavish life style. He owned a large home located at
two Waterloo row, North Calvert Street in Baltimore, Maryland.300 Homes
on Waterloo Row sold for between ten to twelve thousand dollars when
they were completed in 1819.301 He also owned 300 acres of farmland in
Maryland.302 Gooding also owned the Timonium Estates, a hotel in
Maryland that also featured an icehouse, mineral springs, stables, a jockey
club and a racetrack.303 However, like many merchants in Baltimore,
Gooding was severely impacted by the Panic of 1819. He resorted to renting
out his house in Baltimore, and was forced to sell his country house and
farm to settle his debts to creditors.304 By 1829, Gooding went insolvent.305
Gooding died in 1839.306
It is unknown why Gooding chose to name his ship the General
Winder. The proximate connection between Gooding and a General with the
last name Winder would be William H. Winder, a general and veteran of the
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War of 1812 that practice law in Baltimore, Maryland.307 A large part of
Winder’s legal practice was representing merchants and captains.308 Winder
died in 1824 and the General Winder first set sail in 1824. Gooding
purchased the General Winder, while it was still under construction, from
William McElderry. 309 McElderry was a ship builder in the Port of
Baltimore, and may have picked the name. 310
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APPENDIX II: A MAP VOLUME AND DIRECTION OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE FROM ALL AFRICAN TO ALL AMERICAN REGIONS**

**

DAVID ELTIS & DAVID RICHARDSON, ATLAS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
(New Haven, 2010) (This map summarizes and combines the many different paths by
which captives left Africa and reached the Americas. While there were strong connections
between particular embarkation and disembarkation regions, it was also the case that
captives from any of the major regions of Africa could disembark in almost any of the
major regions of the Americas.)

